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As the security landscape evolves over time, where thousands of species of malicious codes are seen every day, antivirus vendors
strive to detect and classify malware families for efficient and effective responses against malware campaigns. To enrich this effort
and by capitalizing on ideas from the social network analysis domain, we build a tool that can help classify malware families using
features driven from the graph structure of their system calls. To achieve that, we first construct a system call graph that consists
of system calls found in the execution of the individual malware families. To explore distinguishing features of various malware
species, we study social network properties as applied to the call graph, including the degree distribution, degree centrality, average
distance, clustering coefficient, network density, and component ratio. We utilize features driven from those properties to build a
classifier for malware families. Our experimental results show that “influence-based” graph metrics such as the degree centrality
are effective for classifying malware, whereas the general structural metrics of malware are less effective for classifying malware.
Our experiments demonstrate that the proposed system performs well in detecting and classifying malware families within each
malware class with accuracy greater than 96%.
1. Introduction
Despite the increasing efforts and investments antivirus
(AV) vendors are making to defend against the spread of
malware families, malware infection is still one of today’s
most serious threats in the global security landscape.Malware
infection is considered the first step inmany attacks launched
by cyber criminals, and the ever increasing numbers of
malware families have made defense against those criminals
a difficult task. According to recent reports by AV-TEST
[1], approximately 60 million new pieces of malware are
reported for the period from January 2013 to December 2014.
Techniques utilized for creating those malware pieces have
evolved over time, and malware authors create new malware
variants employing various circumvention techniques, such
as encryption, polymorphism, and obfuscation. To defend
against malware, AV vendors analyze tens of thousands
of pieces of malware every day and prevent them from
spreading, thus putting themselves and cyber criminals in an
endless arms race.
Cyber criminals can easily create malware variants with
the same semantics by reusing the same core code. Although
they generate many malware variants for the same malware
family, the base malware families have the invariant charac-
teristics and patterns, of malicious behaviors.Those invariant
characteristics can be derived from the instruction or binary
code of the malware. Utilizing signature-based techniques
to capture the similarity between the base family and its
variants has several shortcomings. Using polymorphism or
metamorphism techniques, malware can evade the detection
technique while maintaining its behavior unchanged.
Cyber defenders, including AV vendors, are not reactive
to malware and generate signatures to partly or wholly
address the obfuscation and encryption circumvention
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techniques [2]. However, signature-based methods require
human intervention to construct signatures based on domain
knowledge, and defenders should update the signature
databases with new signatures continuously. While these
approaches are effective for known malware, they cannot
detect unknown malware, particularly zero-day attacks. To
overcome those shortcomings, the research community has
established the alternative of behavior-based methods for
malware detection utilizing dynamic analysis of malicious
binaries.
Using dynamic analysis, various prior studies proposed
malware analysis methods that exploit one or more behav-
ioral aspects of the malware execution, including statisti-
cal methods leveraging the system or API call sets [3–5],
instruction pattern sets [6], or call graph matching [7, 8].
The prior work assumes that the malicious behavior of a
malware sample is determined by a distinguishing call or
instruction set. Since such call or instruction sets form a
specific frequency distribution or have unique call sequences,
they can be used as one of themetrics for classifyingmalware.
However, these methods are weak in detecting malware vari-
ants generated by polymorphism techniques (e.g., statement
reordering or junk code insertion) and can hardly detect
newmalware or variants.The prior call graph-basedmethods
are mainly based on similarity search [7, 8]. Furthermore,
the similarity matching algorithms utilized to achieve this
end goal are computationally heavy and can result in high
false alarms. The computational overhead associated with
the similarity matching makes it hard to produce a real-
time system for detection and classification—a feature often
desirable in many industrial systems. In addition, these
methods using graph properties are limited to depicting the
structural information of malware itself.
To overcome drawbacks of previous system call-based
techniques, we propose a novel and lightweight classification
method that examines the topological structure and influence
properties of system call graph—in a way analogous to graph
properties in the social network analysis. We assume that
the malicious behavior is characterized by differences in the
system calls of a malware. As with social networks analysis,
the system call set has an influence on the behavior of the
program. Therefore, we can detect the malicious behavior
of programs by generating the system call graph of the
malware and exploring its network properties. We prepare a
malicious system call dictionary to classify malware families
within each malware class (in this paper, “malware class”
denotes malware type (e.g., adware, Trojan, and worm)). As
we examine various network properties of system calls found
in malware, we can classify malware families within each
malware class.
Contribution. It is as follows:
(i) Wepropose a novel classificationmethod that exploits
network properties that are heavily studied in the
social network analysis field, such as the degree distri-
bution, degree centrality, and average distance. To the
best of our knowledge, this work is the first attempt
to examine the topological and node properties of
malicious system calls in a call graph. Utilizing a small
feature set for classification, our system is scalable
and lightweight, compared to othermethods from the
literature. In practice, the proposed system enables
AV vendors to react to malware in a scalable and
lightweight manner. In building the main system call
graph used for extracting the features for classifi-
cation, our method only requires statistical values
related to the network analysis function and does not
impose any additional computational overhead.
(ii) We demonstrate experimentally and using real-world
data the capabilities of our system in detecting various
malware families with accuracy greater than 96%.
(iii) While our method mainly utilizes dynamic analysis
formalware classification, it is also flexible in utilizing
static analysis by extracting API call features.
Organization. The rest of this paper is organized as follows.
In Section 2, we review the previous work. In Section 3, we
review preliminaries of the social network analysis. Data
exploration to find meaningful features for automatic clas-
sification is presented in Section 4. In Section 5, we present
our classificationmethod. In Section 6, we present the results
and performance evaluation. In Section 7, we discuss the
limitation of our proposed method. Finally, in Section 8, we
state our conclusions and future research directions.
2. Related Work
Most of the previous work on detection or classification of
malware used signature-based or behavior-based methods.
Table 1 summarizes such methods in the literature. In the
following, we review some of this literature in more details.
2.1. Static Analysis. Static analysis techniques rely on exam-
ining the binary code to determine its properties without
actually executing it.There are two types of methods of static
analysis depending on the features utilized for operation: sta-
tistical and graph matching-based methods. In the statistical
method, defenders transform the binary code of malware
into an assembly code to extract and analyze characteristics,
such as the n-grams of instruction or call patterns.The graph
matching method is mainly based on similarity matching.
For that, defenders build call graphs (e.g., system call graph,
function-call graph, or API call graph), compare graphs with
each other, and classify malware based on howwell defenders
match with previously known behaviors of the givenmalware
species. Using polymorphism or metamorphism techniques,
malware can disguise its appearance while keeping its behav-
ior unchanged. As a result, such techniques using signature-
based methods are easily evaded by cyber criminals.
Researchers also looked at realizing static analysis on
instruction or call pattern. Christodorescu and Jha [13]
implemented a static analyzer named SAFE, which can
analyze executables using predefined malicious instruction
patterns. Kolter andMaloof [14] demonstrated how text clas-
sification can be applied to malware classification by extract-
ing byte sequences from executables, converting those byte
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Table 1: Various static and dynamic analysis approaches in previous works.
Approach Method Viewpoint Previous works
Static analysis
Graph matching Instruction [9]
API call [10–12]
Statistical method (frequency and sequence)
Instruction [13]
Bytecode [14–16]
API call [17–19]
Dynamic analysis
Graph matching Instruction [7]
System call [8, 20]
Statistical method (frequency and sequence)
Instruction [6]
System call [3, 5]
API call [4]
sequences into n-grams and constructing several classifiers.
Reddy and Pujari [15] proposed a detection method utilizing
the frequency pattern of the n-grams in binaries as an alter-
native method to measure information gain. Tabish et al. [16]
proposed a malware detection method based on the analysis
of byte-level file content. They computed a wide range of
statistical and information-theoretic features in a block-wise
manner to quantify the byte-level file content. Shankarapani
et al. [17] have proposed the malware detection methods
named SAFE andMEDiC; SAFE used API call sequences and
MEDiC used assembly codes as feature vectors. Sung et al.
[18] proposed the signature-basedmethod named SAVE, and
they compared the API sequences of malicious files with
those of a signature database. Wang et al. [19] proposed
a malware detection method that can identify suspicious
behavior through the frequency of a predefined API call set.
Many researchers used call graphs as structural infor-
mation in detecting malware. Bruschi et al. [9] proposed
a self-mutating malware detection method that compares
the control flow graph of a target program with that of
known malware. Hu et al. [10] proposed a malware database
management system named SMIT, which can efficiently
make determination based on the function-call graph of
malware. SMIT also used properties of the function-call
graph to implement an efficient nearest-neighbor search
algorithm for large malware datasets. Lee et al. [11] proposed
a metamorphic malware detection method. They converted
API call sequences into a call graph to extract the semantics
of the malware and reduced the call graph to a code graph for
computational cost reduction. Wu¨chner et al. [12] proposed
a behavioral malware detection approach based on a system-
wide quantitative data flow model. To gather the relevant
information, they leveraged API calls.
2.2. Dynamic Analysis. Dynamic analysis approaches run
executables inside the isolated environment to capture the
runtime behavior.These approaches extract behavioral char-
acteristics through taint analysis on the relation of system
or API caller-callee. This approach addresses obfuscation,
packing attempts, and self-modification, since all of those
approaches are eliminated during the execution of malware
[21].
Many methods are proposed for dynamic analysis using
instruction or call patterns. Anderson et al. [7] proposed a
malware detection method that analyzes graphs constructed
from instruction traces. They extended the 2-gram method
utilizing the transition probabilities of a Markov chain; they
treated the Markov chain as a graph and used the graph
kernel to construct a similarity matrix, which is then used for
analyzingmalware samples based on their similarity. Fredrik-
son et al. [20] introduced an automatic malware detection
system (Holmes), which extracts dependence graph with
system calls, mines significant behaviors from samples, and
synthesizes an optimally discriminative specifications from
mined behaviors. Kolbitsch et al. [8] proposed a malware
detection method utilizing system call patterns based on
data flow dependencies.They tracked dependencies between
system calls and compared the runtime behavior of unknown
programs with pregenerated behavioral graphs.
Dai et al. [6] proposed amalware detectionmethod using
dynamic instruction sequences. They converted runtime
instruction sequences into basic blocks and extracted fre-
quent instruction groups for instruction’s relative frequency
calculation as features for a classification model. Bayer
et al. [3] proposed a malware clustering architecture using
taint analysis with system calls. They extracted behavioral
profiles by abstracting the system calls, their dependencies,
and network activities and applied locality sensitive hashing
on the behavioral profiles to achieve efficient and scalable
malware clustering. Yuxin et al. [5] proposed a malware
detection method that analyzes binary code to derive system
call sequences and utilizes features based on n-grams. Bayer
et al. [4] introduced TTAnalyze, a system for analyzing the
behavior of an unknown program by executing the code.
Their tool records security-relevant system or API calls
triggered in the execution and generates reports including file
activity, registry activity, and network activity.
3. Background
When a program is executed, it invokes a series of relevant
system calls. For example, in order to open a specific file and
then write to it, a program successively invokes NtCreateFile,
NtCreateSection, NtMapViewofSection, and NtWriteFile. The
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intermediate system calls, namely, the NtCreateSection and
NtMapViewofSection, play a role in bridging between source
and destination system calls. In other words, system calls
interact with other system calls, whereas intermediate system
calls pass information to destination system calls.
In an analogous manner, we can explain this behavior
through the lenses of social network analysis techniques
as a tool. Social network analysis (SNA) has its origin in
social science and scientific theories such as network analysis
and graph theory. Network analysis concerns itself with the
foundation and problem-solving pertaining to transforming
problem into a network structure in the form of graph and
using well-established algorithms for understanding such
graphs.
Graph theory provides a set of the abstract concepts
and methods for the analysis of such graphs. SNA in social
science conceptualizes social structure as a network with ties
connecting members. SNA can also conceptualize a range of
problems in other domains, such as social networks, techno-
logical networks, and information networks. Technological
networks, man-made networks designed for distribution of
commodity or resource, such as electricity or information,
are also studied using the same tools.The network of mobile
stations is a good example for such applications, wheremobile
network operators use SNA to optimize the structure and
capacity of their networks [22]. Other technological networks
that have been studied include the network of electric power
grid, airline routes, roads networks, railways, and pedestrian
traffic networks [23].
In a similar way, when malware is executed it consecu-
tively calls out a predefined set of system calls. We record
those system calls as a sequence and construct a system call
graph from this sequence.The system call graph is a directed
graph 퐺 = (푉,퐸), where 푉 is a set of nodes and 퐸 is a set of
edges. A node represents a system call that is invoked, and an
edge is determined by the call sequence of the system calls
in 푉: 퐸 = {⟨V푖, V푗⟩ | V푖, V푗 ∈ 푉, V푖 ∈ 푉푚 or V푗 ∈ 푉푚},
where V푖 denotes the former system call in the sequence and
V푗 denotes the system call right after it.푉푚 represents element
of malicious system call dictionary, 푉푚 ⊆ 푉. We now define
the system call graph more formally.
Definition 1 (system call graph). A system call graph is
a directed graph defined by 4 tuples as follows: 푔 =(푉푔,퐸푔, 퐿푔, 푙푔) where 푉푔 is the vertex set representing the
system calls, 퐸푔 ⊆ 푉푔 × 푉푔 is the edge set corresponding
to a function, 퐿푔 is the set of labels that can identify each
system call, and 푙푔 is the labeling function that assigns labels
to vertices.
We transform such call sequence into a system call
graph to examine the social network properties through SNA
tools. We extract system call trace from a target program
as illustrated in Figure 1(a). Analyzing dependency among
system calls, we build a system call sequence (or a system call
graph) as shown in Figure 1(b) [24]. In particular, as tracking
the arguments of system call (e.g., FileHandle and Section-
Handle), we know dependency or sequence among system
calls and build a system call graph of the target program.
By comparing nodes of call graph with predefined malicious
system call dictionary, we extract system calls found in
malware and their one-hop neighbor (refined system call
sequence); we finally make such refined system call sequence
to depict a system call graph as illustrated in Figure 1(b).The
system call graphwe defined consists of nodes included in the
predefined malicious system call dictionary and nodes that
are one-hop neighbors of aforementioned nodes. For exam-
ple, in Figure 1(b), one-hop neighbor of NtCreateSection is
NtCreateFile andNtMapViewofSection. SinceNtCreateSection
exists in themalicious system call dictionary,NtCreateSection
establishes edge with NtCreateFile and NtMapViewofSection.
We disallow the presence of multiple edges but allow the
presence of self-edge (loops), when building the system call
graph. To measure the influence of system calls found in
malware, we generate a system call graph and adopt both
the centrality and cohesion measures for understanding the
underlying graph. Centrality is a measure of how many
connections one node has with others and captures the
prominence of a node in the network. Centrality measures
include the degree, betweenness, and closeness centralities.
On the other hand, cohesion is a measure to characterize
the structure of a network. Cohesion measures include the
clustering coefficient, average distance, network density, and
component ratio; cohesion measures are quantified as a
conjunct relation among nodes in the perspective of the
network level in a system call graph.
In the following, we define several measures of centrality
and cohesion and use them to explore the previously defined
graph for distinctive features of malware families’ identifica-
tion and classification.
3.1. Degree Distribution. The degree distribution tells us
the network structure and is one of the most fundamental
network properties [25–27]. The degree distribution is the
probability distribution of degrees over the whole network.
The degree distribution 푝(푘) is defined as the fraction of
nodes with degree 푘 in the network. If there are 푛 nodes in the
network and 푛푘 nodes with degree 푘, we define 푝(푘) = 푛푘/푛.
A large majority of nodes have low degree, whereas a
small number of nodes have high degree; such nodes are
known as hubs. A minority of nodes with high degree have
more influence.When the degree distribution on logarithmic
scales is approximately represented by a straight line, we say
that the distribution follows a power-lawdistribution [25, 26].
Newman [25] proved that many real networks, such as
the Internet topology, networks for city population, word fre-
quency, earthquakes magnitude, and moon creator diameter,
have degree distributions with a tail of high degree.
3.2. Degree Centrality. The degree centrality is a measure of
how well a node is connected with other nodes in terms
of directed connections. This is, the degree centrality is the
number of links that a node has with others [26, 28]. A
directed graph has in- and out-degree centralities, defined as
follows:
(1) In-degree: defined as the number of ties directed
toward the node.
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(1) Process 2160 starting at 00402264
(3) Loaded DLL at 77250000 ntdll.dll
(5) NtCreateFile(FileHandle = A, . . . , ObjectAttributes =“Sample.exe”)
(7) NtCreateFile(FileHandle = B, . . . , ObjectAttributes = “1111.exe”)
(9) NtCreateSection(SectionHandle = C, . . . , FileHandle = B)
(2) C:WUsersW· · ·WSample.exe
(4) · · ·
(6) · · ·
(8) · · ·
(12) · · ·
(14) · · ·
(13) NtQueryInformationFile(FileHandle = A, IoStatusBlock = · · ·)
(11) NtWriteFile(FileHandle = B, · · ·)
· · ·)(10) NtMapViewOfSection(SectionHandle = C,
(a) System call trace
NtCreateFile
NtCreateSection NtQueryInformationFile
NtMapViewOfSection
FileHandle AFileHandle B
SectionHandle C
NtWriteFile
FileHandle B
NtCreateFile,
NtCreateSection,
Malicious system 
call dictionary 
The refined system call sequence
to depict a system call graph
. . . ,
· · ·
(b) A corresponding call graph
Figure 1: Procedure of a converting system call trace into a call graph.
(2) Out-degree: defined as the number of ties that the
node directs toward others.
With the in-degree centrality, a node that has many ties
is characterized as prominent node. On the other hand, with
the out-degree centrality, a node that has a higher out-degree
centrality is characterized as an influential node.
3.3. Betweenness Centrality. The betweenness centrality is a
measure of the degree to which a node serves as a bridge
on the route between other nodes in the graph [26, 28]. The
between centrality is often used as an index of the potential of
a node for controlling communication between other nodes.
The betweenness centrality of a node 푖,푋푖 is defined as푋푖 = ∑푠,푡 푛푖푠푡푔푠푡 , (1)
where 푛푖푠푡 denotes the number of geodesic paths from node 푠
to node 푡 which pass through node 푖 and 푔푠푡 denotes the total
number of geodesic paths from node 푠 to node 푡.
3.4. Clustering Coefficient. The clustering coefficient mea-
sures the average probability in which two neighbors of a
node are neighbors [26, 28] and measures the density of
triangles in the network. We define the clustering coefficient
as the fraction of transitive triples or the fraction of closed
paths of length two in the network.
3.5. Average Distance. The distance is the ratio of the number
of edges in the geodesic path between all pairs of nodes to the
number of the geodesic path between all pairs of nodes in the
graph. Given a connected network, the average distance (AD)
is given by
AD = ∑{푖,푗}:푙푔(푖,푗) ̸=∞ 푙푔 (푖, 푗)儨儨儨儨儨{{푖, 푗} : 푙푔 (푖, 푗) ̸= ∞}儨儨儨儨儨 , (2)
where 푙푔(푖, 푗) denotes the number of edges in the geodesic
path connecting nodes 푖 and 푗 in the network.
3.6. Network Density. The network density is the ratio of
the number of edges in the network to the total number of
possible edges between all pairs of nodes.That is, the network
density is defined as the fraction of edges that are actually
present in the graph [26, 28]. Assuming no multiedge or self-
edge in the graph, the network density is given by휌 = 푚( 푛2 ) = 2푚푛 (푛 − 1) = 푘푛 − 1 , (3)
where 푛, 푚, and 푘 denote the number of nodes, the number
of edges, and the average degree, respectively. As the number
of nodes becomes infinite, the network density becomes 푘/푛
and the mean degree becomes a constant.
3.7. Component Ratio. A component is a subset of the nodes
of a network such that there exists at least one shortest path
from any member of that subset to other members [26].The
component ratio is defined as the number of components
to the number of nodes. When 푐 denotes the number of
components, the component ratio is (푐 − 1)/(푛 − 1); where푛 is the number of nodes.
4. Data Exploration
In the following, we explore the distinguishing power of
the aforementionedmeasures in classifyingmalware families.
We use various measures that examine the entire structure,
substructure, and node properties in the social network
analysis with their interpretation and how this interpretation
is analogous to the problem at hand.
In order to estimate the behavior pattern of malware
with respect to the influence of system calls, we measure the
degree distribution, degree centrality, betweenness centrality,
clustering coefficient, average distance, network density, and
component ratio as features. Based on data exploration, we
determinemetrics formalware analysis. For data exploration,
we used 3,615 malware samples representing 3 malware
classes with 9 malware families and 153 benign samples; we
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will explain malware and benign samples in more detail in
Section 6. We develop the malicious system call dictionary
through empirical experiments with the various samples we
had.We choose the system calls so that our system can detect
and classify malware families within each malware class.
We build the system call dictionary representing malicious
activities, as outlined by the prior work on malware analysis
[8, 29, 30]. To that end, we extract call sequence list of the
system calls found in malware and their one-hop neighbors
by comparing the call sequence of each malware sample
with the predefined malicious system call dictionary. We
transform such call sequence list into a system call graph
to examine the social network properties. The details of the
malicious system call dictionary are listed in the appendix.
Degree Distribution. First, we explore the degree distribution
of malware system calls and outline various results. First,
we observe that system calls with high in-degree centrality
are the system calls found in malware related to creating
local procedure calls (e.g., NtAlpcSendWaitReceivePort and
NtAlpcConnectPort in adware) and synchronization (e.g.,
NtReleaseMutant in adware). On the other hand, we observe
that system calls with in-degree centrality of 1 are mostly
composed of system calls in the benign program related to file
creation or opening, section creation, and process creation or
termination; a few of system calls found in malware related
to process creation (e.g., NtCreateWorkerFactory in adware)
and synchronization (e.g., NtCreateKeyedEvent in adware)
are included and exhibit the same feature. The details of
the distribution of in-degree centrality in adware are listed
in the appendix. Since system call patterns determine the
program behavior, the malware calls out more system calls
found in malware than system calls in benign program while
conducting its malicious behavior. Thus, if the system calls
with higher degree—the system calls found in malware—are
deleted in the system call graph, those networks that exhibit
the malicious behavior can collapse. We assume that system
calls found in malware have significant influence on network
structure of the system call graph such as degree distribution.
Figure 2 shows that the in-degree distribution of the
malware system calls is highly right-skewed. The plot on
the logarithmic scale in Figure 3 suggests that the in-degree
distribution of the malware system calls follows a power-law
distribution with noise in the right-hand side. To test the
power-law hypothesis, we conduct a goodness of fit test over
the binned empirical data [31]. We estimate the parameters푝(푥min) and 훼 of the power-law model as shown in Table 2.
Since the푝 value is larger than 0.1, the power-law is a plausible
statistical hypothesis for our data set.Thus, we conclude that
the degree distribution of malware system calls follows the
power-law distribution approximately.
This test implies that a system call does not connect
other system calls uniformly.Most system calls are connected
to one system call and a few (popular) system calls are
connected to numerous system calls. The portion of those
calls with degree of one is significantly different among
malware families as illustrated in Figure 2; formalware family
the portion of calls with degree one is different from a
Table 2:The result of goodness of fit test.
Malware IDa 푝(푥min) 훼 푝 value
Win32.FakeInstaller 001 .13889 2.21598 .65634
Win32.ScreenSaver 001 .11765 1.86510 .54446
Win32.SideTab 001 .04167 1.82649 .17682
Malware IDa: the malware we used for experiments has a unique identifier
as hash digest. For shortening the unique identifier, we used Malware ID as
a sequence number.
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Figure 2: In-degree distribution of malware system calls (adware
case).
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Figure 3: Log-scale in-degree distribution of system calls (adware
case).
uniform distribution.The portion of system calls with degree
of one gives hints on a good feature for classifying malware
families.
Networks with power-law degree distribution are called
scale-free networks, where they exhibit a number of interest-
ing network properties with respect to degree distribution,
Mathematical Problems in Engineering 7
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Po
rti
on
 o
f s
ys
te
m
 ca
lls
 w
ith
 o
ut
-d
eg
re
e o
f 1
Portion of system calls with in-degree of 1
Win32.FakeInstaller
Win32.ScreenSaver
Win32.SideTab
(a) Adware
Win32.Llac
Win32.Pakes
Win32.Regrun
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Po
rti
on
 o
f s
ys
te
m
 ca
lls
 w
ith
 o
ut
-d
eg
re
e o
f 1
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Portion of system calls with in-degree of 1
(b) Trojan
Win32.Mydoom
Win32.Mytob
Win32.Zwr
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Po
rti
on
 o
f s
ys
te
m
 ca
lls
 w
ith
 o
ut
-d
eg
re
e o
f 1
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Portion of system calls with in-degree of 1
(c) Worm
Figure 4: Distribution of portion of system calls for each malware family, (a) adware, (b) Trojan, and (c) worm (where in-degree and out-
degree are 1).
centrality, and cohesion. We use network properties of the
system call graph to classifymalware. Based on such property,
the portion of system calls with in-degree of one is much
higher than that of system calls with in-degree greater than
one, and the ratio varies according to the malware family
in question. Thus, the difference in the portion of system
calls with in-degree of one can be used as a major metric for
classifying malware.The out-degree distribution of malware
system calls is similar to the in-degree distribution and can
be used—with similar rationale—as a distinguishing feature
of malware families.
Road to Feature Selection. Figure 4 shows that malware
samples are grouped according to their family utilizing two
portions of the system calls: the portion with in-degree of
1 and the portion with out-degree of 1. We thus choose
these portions as principal features to classify malware. Note
that the plot for weighted in- and out-degrees of 1 has
approximately the same shape as that for in- and out-degrees
of 1 as illustrated in Figure 4.
Degree Centrality. Second, we explore the degree centrality
of malware system calls. For each system call, the sum of
in-degrees is equal to the sum of out-degrees [26]; that is,
the average degree centrality is twice the average in-degree
centrality or the average out-degree centrality. For dimen-
sionality reduction, we only consider the average in-degree
centrality. The average in-degree centrality of system calls
classifies each adware family—the results of data exploration
for Trojan and worm are described in the appendix—as
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Figure 5: Average in-degree centrality (adware case).
illustrated in Figure 5. In conclusion, we observe that the
average in-degree centrality is also good as a feature for
classifying Trojan and worm.
Betweenness Centrality. Third, we examine the average
betweenness centrality of each malware system call. We plot
the average betweenness centrality of system calls according
to adware sample in Figure 6. This shows that the average
betweenness centrality of about half of Win32.ScreenSaver
samples is similar to that of Win32.FakeInstaller samples. We
also observe that the average betweenness centrality is a poor
measure (compared to the previously examined measures)
for classifying Trojan families. We notice that the average
betweenness centrality is a good measure for only classify-
ing worm families. Conceptually, centrality measures (e.g.,
betweenness centrality and degree centrality) represent a dif-
ferent process by which key nodesmight influence the flow of
information in a network.Measures of betweenness centrality
and degree centrality are not occasionally highly correlated
with each other, according to properties of networks [32].
Despite the general belief that such centrality is a good feature
for classifying malware, in this study betweenness centrality
is shown to be a poor feature for classifying malware. To
this end, we consider that the average betweenness centrality
is inappropriate for classifying malware in general when
utilized alone.
Structural Measures. Fourth, we explore the overall structural
information of the malware system call graph using the over-
all clustering coefficient, average distance, network density,
and component ratio—all defined earlier. We examine the
overall clustering coefficient of each malware system call,
which is obtained by averaging the clustering coefficient over
the number of system calls. We observe that the overall
clustering coefficient is not a good basis for a classifier as
illustrated in Figure 7, since many malware families such
as Win32.SideTab and Win32.ScreenSaver overlap in such
feature. We observe that the overall clustering coefficient
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Figure 6: Average betweenness centrality (adware case).
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Figure 7: Overall clustering coefficient (adware case).
is also a bad measure for classifying Trojan and worm
families, although it could potentially be useful in classifying
individual families. To this end, we conclude that the overall
clustering coefficient is a bad measure and discard it as a
potential feature.
On the other hand, the average distance groups all adware
samples according to each family as illustrated in Figure 8.
We observe that the average distance is a good feature for
classifying Trojan and worm families.
Next, we examine the network density and component
ratio of eachmalware system call.Weplot the network density
of system calls according to adware sample in Figure 9, which
shows that all malware samples—except the Win32.SideTab
samples—have similar network density. To this end, we
conclude that the network density is also not effective in
classifying any of the Trojan and worm families.
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Figure 9: Network density (adware case).
Finally, we plot the component ratio according to adware
sample in Figure 10, which shows that all malware samples—
except theWin32.SideTab samples—have similar component
ratio. In the case of Trojan, not all families can be classified
using the component ratio. For example, the component
ratio of about half of Win32.Zwr samples is similar to that
of Win32.Mydoom samples with worms. Thus, the graph
metrics of overall structure, such as the overall clustering
coefficient, network density, and component ratio of system
calls, are inappropriate for classifying malware. Notice that
while the properties demonstrated in Figures 5–10 cannot be
used individually to definitively classify malware, the partial
power of these features can, when combined with other
properties, assist the accuracy of classification.
Table 3 lists the results of additional data exploration
that we conducted to find distinctive features for automatic
classification.Wefind that the network diameter andH-index
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Figure 10: Component ratio (adware case).
cannot be used for classification, whereas all other measures
can be used to classify families in a binary learning process
(two classes).
5. System Overview
After finding social network properties that distinguish
behavioral traits of each malware sample, we implemented
an automatic classification system based on such features.
When amalicious program is passed to our system, it extracts
system calls found inmalware and their one-hop neighbors to
examine their network (graph) properties (refined system call
sequence). The system then compares the graph properties
in the malicious program with those in each malware family
and classifies malware to the proper families accordingly.
As illustrated in Figure 11, our system is composed of three
modules: the Behavior Identification Module, the Graph
Metric Extraction Module, and the Classification Module.
5.1. Behavior Identification Module (BI Module). Our system
analyzes malware through dynamic analysis.The BI module
executes the givenmalicious program for 30 seconds and cap-
tures system call sequences through NtTrace (retrieved from
http://www.howzatt.demon.co.uk/NtTrace/).The BI module
then compares them with the predefined malicious system
call dictionary, extracts system calls found in malware and
their one-hop neighbors, and makes the refined system call
sequences depict a system call graph.
5.2. Graph Metric Extraction Module (Graph Module). The
graph module extracts the network properties according to
the preselected metrics of SNA listed in Table 4. We notice
that while the first set of the network-level properties are
associated with what would seem to be a node-level feature,
the fact that they are distributions of the feature makes them
a network-level characteristic (as they are measured by the
collective set of nodes).
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Table 3:The result of additional SNA measure explorations.
Category Measure of SNA Result of exploration
Centrality
Avg. normalizeda betweenness centrality
Can classify only wormAvg. normalized weightedb in-degree centrality
Avg. normalized weighted out-degree centrality
Cohesion Network diameter,퐻-index Cannot classify all classes
Number of strong connected components Cannot classify Trojan
normalizeda: normalized betweenness/in-degree/out-degree centrality is the betweenness/in-degree/out-degree centrality divided by the maximum
betweenness/in-degree/out-degree centrality.
weightedb: weighted degree centrality is the number of weighted links that a node has with other nodes in the network.The weighted links represent the amount
of duplicated links between two nodes in the network.
Table 4: Measures of social network analysis for malware analysis.
Scope Category Measure name
Node level Centrality Average in-degree centrality
Average weighted in-degree centrality
Network level Degree distribution
Portion of calls with in-degree of 1
Portion of calls with out-degree of 1
Portion of calls with weighted in-degree of 1
Portion of calls with weighted out-degree of 1
Cohesion Average distance
Behavior identification module 
Executable program
Result output
Graph metric extraction module
Classification module
Figure 11: Overview of Mal-Netminer system.
5.3. Classification Module (Class Module). There are vari-
ous supervised learning algorithms in the machine learn-
ing community, including probabilistic-, rule-, function-,
instance-, and tree-based algorithm and ensemble algo-
rithms (based on the approach taken for solving the clas-
sification problem). Table 5 shows that previous work tried
multiple classifiers for malware detection or classification.
Following that, for an automatic classification, we choose
Na¨ıve Bayes, RIPPER, RBF, decision tree (C4.5), 퐾-NN, and
boosting (AdaBoost) classifiers. The class module utilized
WEKA, a Java-based machine learning toolkit (retrieved
from http://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka/).
Naı¨ve Bayes.The Naı¨ve Bayes classifier is a probabilistic clas-
sifier based on applying Bayes’ theorem with independence
assumptions [44]. For a given feature, this method computes
Table 5: Malware classification and detection models using various
learning algorithms.
Category Classifier Previous works
Probabilistic-based algorithm Naı¨ve Bayes [14, 19, 33–35]
Rule-based algorithm RIPPER [33, 35]
Function-based algorithm
SVM [6, 7, 14, 34, 36–38]
MLP [33, 38]
RBF [39, 40]
Instance-based algorithm 퐾-NN [14, 33, 34, 36, 38]
Tree-based algorithm Decision tree [6, 14, 16, 34, 36, 38]
Ensemble algorithm
Random forest [38, 41]
Boosting [14, 16]
Voting [42]
Bagging [41, 43]
the likelihood that a program is malicious. The method
assumes that the attributes 푋1,푋2, . . . ,푋푛 are all condition-
ally independent of one another, for a given class label 푦.This
dramatically simplifies the representation of 푃(푋푗 | 푌 = 푦)
and the problem of estimating it from the training data.The
conditional independence assumption is given by푃 (푋 | 푌 = 푦) = 푛∏푖=1푃 (푋푗 | 푌 = 푦) . (4)
RIPPER. RIPPER is a rule-based learning algorithm. It builds
a set of rules that identify the classes while minimizing the
amount of error. The error in RIPPER is determined by
the number of training examples. This technique is easy to
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understand and is usually better than decision algorithm [45].
However, it is sensitive to noise and is not scalable as the
training dataset size increases.
Radial Basis Function (RBF) Network. A Radial Basis Func-
tion (RBF) network is an artificial neural network that uses
radial basis as activation functions; RBF is feed-forward net-
works trained using a supervised algorithm [40].The naming
of RBF comes from the fact that the basis functions in the
hidden layer nodes are radially symmetric.The activation of
a hidden layer node is computed by Gaussian function using
the Euclidean distance or Mahalanobis distance between
the input vector and the center of the basis function. The
output of the network is a linear combination of radial basis
functions of the inputs and neuron parameters. The neural
network algorithms including RBF enable the performance
of tasks which a linear program cannot solve but do not
guarantee an optimal solution.
Decision Tree (C4.5). A decision tree is a decision support tool
that uses a tree-like graph with internal nodes corresponding
to attributes and leaf nodes corresponding to class labels [45].
Each internal node splits the instance space into two or more
subspaces according to certain criteria such as information
gain. This process is repeated recursively until a node has
homogeneous characteristics. At that point, the class label is
assigned. Most decision tree algorithms use the gain ratio to
determine whether a certain internal node should be split or
not.The merits of decision trees are that they are inexpensive
to execute, fast at classifying unknown records, and easy to
interpret when small enough.
K-Nearest Neighbors (K-NN).TheK-NNalgorithm is a type of
lazy learning or instance-based algorithm. Lazy learning is a
learningmethod inwhich the systemdelays generalization on
the training data until it receives queries; in other words, the
system simply stores training data and waits until it receives
a test tuple [45]. The 퐾-NN algorithm is one of the simplest
algorithms in machine learning: a new instance is classified
by a majority vote of its 퐾 nearest neighbors.This technique
needs much space to store the entire training data set and is
sensitive to noise, but it effectively uses a richer hypothesis
space in that it uses many local linear functions to form an
implicit global approximation to the target function.
Boosting (AdaBoost). Boosting is one of the learning algo-
rithms that combine multiple classifiers. It is a meta-
algorithm that can be used in conjunction with many other
learning algorithms to improve their performance. Boosting
produces a set of weighted models by iteratively learning
a model from a weighted data set, evaluating the model
and reweighting the data set based on the performance
evaluation results. AdaBoost (short for adaptive boosting) is
an algorithm for constructing a strong classifier as a linear
combination of simple weak classifiers through weighted
vote. AdaBoost improves classification accuracy and gen-
eralizes fairly but does not guarantee an optimal solution.
We used the AdaBoost algorithm to boost the Na¨ıve Bayes,
RIPPER, RBF, 퐾-NN, and C4.5 algorithms.
6. Performance Evaluation
6.1. Experiment Setup. The 3,615 malware samples (our
dataset is available at http://ocslab.hksecurity.net/mal net-
miner) listed in Table 6 were collected through web crawling
and malware repository such as Virusshare (retrieved from
http://virusshare.com/) andMalwareblacklist (retrieved from
http://malwareblacklist.com/); duplicated malware samples
were eliminated based on thematch of their SHA 256.We also
excluded malware samples identified by fewer than 20AV
vendors included in the Virustotal dataset [46]. We used the
textual description ofmalware that were produced byKasper-
sky Lab (retrieved from http://www.kaspersky.com/). To get
a representative set of benign samples, we used the 30 most
popular programs (e.g., web browser and word processor)
from [47] and 123 preinstalled benign programs in Windows
system 32 directory; totally, we used 153 benign samples
for our experiments. We performed all experiments in a
hypervisor-based virtualization environment (VMware ESXi
(retrieved from http://www.vmware.com/)); we performed
all experiments on Intel Xeon X5660 and 4GB of RAM with
32-bit Windows 7 Professional.
We implemented our proposed method with various
parameters as follows:
(1) To extract the system call sequence list of Windows
PE executables, the BI module was implemented as
a python script coupled with NtTrace. In order to
capture malicious behavior, the BI module executed
the malware sample for 30 seconds. After that, our
system converted the system calls log into gexf file for
depicting call graph into dl file for the graph module
consumption, successively.
(2) To examine the social network properties of each
malware sample, the graph module utilized Ucinet 6
[48]. Since Ucinet 6 supports neither CLI (command
line interface) nor API (application programming
interface)—for automated analysis—the graph mod-
ule used the GUI based hooking mechanism imple-
mented in the python script. Our system stored the
social network properties of each malware sample in
a database.
(3) The “class module” utilized WEKA for the machine
learning component of our system. We set up the
training configuration values of WEKA through
empirical experiments to achieve the best classifica-
tion performance for each classifier as follows:
(a) For Na¨ıve Bayes, wemodified the kernel estima-
tor for numeric attributes.
(to true)
(b) For RIPPER, we modified the seed (to 13), the
minimum total weight of the instance in a rule
(to 1.5), and the number of optimization runs (to
10).
(c) For RBF, we modified the seed to pass on to퐾-means (to 10), the maximum number of
iterations for the logistic regression to perform
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Table 6: Malware samples for experiments.
Malware class Malware family Quantity Behavior characteristics
Adware (1,820)
Win32.FakeInstaller 435 Download malicious files and display unwantedads
Win32.ScreenSaver 1,211 Display random ads in a pop-up
Win32.SideTab 174 Download malicious files and display unwantedads
Trojan (742)
Win32.Llac 352 Download files or give backdoor
Win32.Pakes 176 Install “rogueware” by claiming the computer isinfected by spyware
Win32.Regrun 214 Perform various actions (e.g., spam emails andinfect removable drives)
Worm (1,053)
Win32.Mydoom 646 Spread on the Internet as an attachment toinfected messages
Win32.Mytob 358 Similar to Mydoom, which provides backdoor foran attacker
Win32.Zwr 49 Spread on WinRAR files by infecting RARarchives
(to 1), the minimum standard deviation for the
cluster (to 0.07), and the number of clusters (to
4).
(d) For C4.5, we modified the seed (to 10).
(e) For 퐾-NN, we modified the number of neigh-
bors (to 3) and distance weighting method
(weight by 1/distance).
(f) For AdaBoost, we modified the seed (to 10) and
the resampling (to true).
We used 5-fold cross-validation to evaluate the performance
in our experiments. In the 푘-fold cross-validation, the whole
data set is randomly partitioned into 푘 equal size subsamples;
a single subsample is used as the validation data for testing
themodel, and the other 푘−1 subsamples are used as training
data. We repeated the cross-validation process five times. All
results were averaged over the five runs.
6.2. Experiment Results and Analysis. The performance eval-
uation focuses on the effectiveness of malware classifica-
tion and discriminatory ability of the features. We used
the accuracy as the performance metric, since the metric
for performance evaluation must focus on the predictive
capability of the model. We defined the accuracy as the entire
number of the hits of the classifier (true positives + true
negatives) divided by the whole dataset. The performance
of malware classification model is determined by how well
the model classifies various pieces of malware. Moreover, we
used the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve as the
metric for comparing classification models. The ROC curve
is a plot of true positive rate (TPR) on the 푦-axis against
false positive rate (FPR) on the 푥-axis. To compare the ROC
performance of classifiers intuitively, we calculated the area
under the ROC curve (the AUC) of each classifier, since
the AUC represents the ROC performance in a single scalar
value. If the area under the ROC curve (the AUC) is larger for
one classifier than for others, that classifier is better andmore
robust.
Comparing Different Methods. To the best of our knowledge,
the closest approaches in the literature to our approach
are Fredrikson et al. [20] and Kolbitsch et al.’s work [8].
Fredrikson et al. [20] accurately distinguished unknown
malware with an 86% detection rate, Kolbitsch et al.’s system
[8] provided 93%ofmalware classification. For the complete-
ness of our approach, we need to compare ours with these
approaches.However, they are not available in public; we then
conduct performance evaluation of ours by adopting various
machine learning algorithms as the “class module.”
Discriminatory Ability between Malware and Benign. When
designing an antimalware system, one important factor that
we should also consider is its discriminatory ability between
malware and benign program. Antimalware systems must
detect malware with small errors: false positive and false neg-
ative. Practically, however, we argue that it is more important
for an antimalware system to detect malware with few small
false negatives. On the other hand, onemay consider an array
of opposite opinions; for example, users can be bothered
if their benign programs are misclassified as malware. To
this end, we do not use those measures for performance
evaluation to avoid the ambiguity of interpretation, because
our method classifies three malware families and benign
programs in each malware class. Accordingly, we used the
accuracy and AUC as the performance metric.
Table 7 shows that the (boosted) RIPPER and boosted
C4.5 classifiers outperform the other classifiers in terms
of accuracy. The RIPPER classifier slightly outperforms the
boosted C4.5 and boosted RIPPER classifier. The boosting
algorithm somewhat improves the classification performance
of all classifiers except for the K-NN and RIPPER classifier.
Several factors may have affected the experiment results.
Since the social network properties of some Trojan samples,
such as the average in-degree centrality and portion of system
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Table 7: Comparison of classification accuracies and AUC for 3,615 types of malware and 153 benign samples.
Classifier Accuracy AUC
Dataset 1a Dataset 2b Dataset 3c Dataset 1 Dataset 2 Dataset 3
Na¨ıve Bayes 99.96 90.19 95.16 1.00 0.95 0.98
Boosted NB 99.92 92.56 96.12 1.00 0.93 0.96
RIPPER 99.55 94.61 96.88 0.98 0.92 0.94
Boosted RIPPER 99.61 93.52 97.43 1.00 0.96 0.99
RBF 99.86 90.88 92.95 1.00 0.90 0.96
Boosted RBF 99.97 92.96 96.47 1.00 0.96 0.98
C4.5 99.39 92.87 96.78 0.98 0.87 0.95
Boosted C4.5 99.71 93.32 97.58 1.00 0.95 0.99퐾-NN 99.13 93.05 96.20 1.00 0.96 0.98
Boosted퐾-NN 99.46 92.09 96.25 0.99 0.95 0.97
Dataset 1a: adware + benign, Dataset 2b: Trojan + benign, and Dataset 3c: worm + benign.
calls with in-/out-degree of 1, are similar to those of benign
samples, classifiers need the discriminatory ability between
some Trojan and benign samples that are nonlinearly separa-
ble. With the퐾-NN classifier, the lack of general information
influences the overall performance. It is important to find
an adequate 퐾 parameter for the (boosted) 퐾-NN classifier.
The choice of 퐾 involves an important tradeoff. On the
one hand, if 퐾 is too large, some of the neighbors used to
make a prediction will no longer be similar to the target
of the prediction, and this may bias the prediction. On the
other hand, if 퐾 is too small, the classifier will not have
enough information, so the training dataset will possibly be
misclassified. Since we set 퐾 = 3 in our experiment, the퐾-NN classifier substantially overfitted the input data. With
the Na¨ıve Bayes classifier, the assumption of class conditional
independence, which does not hold perfectly in our dataset,
causes some loss of accuracy. Since the RBF classifier is
limited in classifying data samples with a large Mahalanobis
distance from RBF center, the RBF classifier misclassifies
some benign samples as Trojans.
In our evaluation, the boosted RIPPER and boosted
C4.5 classifier were found to outperform other classifiers
in terms of accuracy and AUC. While the boosted C4.5
classifier performed slightly better than the boosted RIPPER
classifier, the difference of the performance was included
in the performance variation of each classifier. Thus, we
conclude that the boosted C4.5 classifier is the best classifier
for its effectiveness of malware classification and detection.
When a classifier learns a training set, the classifier decides an
optimal weight of feature attributes considering their relative
importance. We study what feature attributes are relatively
more significant in classifying malware. We measure the
importance of feature attributes as the information gain,
defined as follows (of attribute ranking shown in Table 8):
IG (퐶,퐴) = 퐻 (퐶) − 퐻 (퐶 | 퐴) ,
where 퐻 (퐶) = −∑푐∈퐶푝 (푐) log2푝 (푐) ,퐻 (퐶 | 퐴) = −∑푎∈퐴푝 (푎) ∑푐∈퐶푝 (푐 | 푎) log2푝 (푐 | 푎) . (5)
The information gain, IG(퐶,퐴), measures the amount of
entropy decease on a given class 퐶, when providing a feature
attribute 퐴. The decreasing amount of entropy reflects the
additional information gained by adding feature 퐴. In the
formula,퐻(퐶) and퐻(퐶 | 퐴) represent the entropies of class퐶 before and after observing feature 퐴, respectively.
Table 8 shows how much each feature attribute has an
effect on detecting and classifying malware, when utilizing
the information gain for attribute ranking. The rank of
importance of feature attributes changes according to the
dataset, but the top feature in any dataset remains within
the top three features for any other given dataset. With the
ranking, we see that feature attributes such as the average
weighted in-degree centrality, average in-degree centrality,
and portion of calls with in-degree of 1 have a significant
influence on the accuracy of classifier.
Performance Advantage. The proposed method can classify
the malware with fewer features than previous methods
adopting call graph in malware detection and classification.
Moreover, our proposed method only takes 20 seconds (on
average) to classify malicious executable. The majority of
that time is spent to measure social network properties from
Ucinet 6; it takes on average 15 seconds for the graph module
to analyze malware. Since Ucinet 6 supports neither CLI
nor relevant API, more reduction and optimization of Graph
analysis time are out of the scope of this work. Nonetheless,
the metrics that measure the social network properties of
system calls found in malware enable us to build a quick and
simple detection system against malware.
7. Discussion
Mal-Netminer against Evasion Attacks. Malware authors
create new malware variants embedding various detection
circumvention techniques, such as obfuscation and packing.
Moreover, early work in the anomaly detection community
showed how they can be subject to a slew of evasions [49,
50]. One wonders how resilient our approach is to evasions
(e.g., mimicry attacks). Perhaps such attacks would create
disconnected subgraphs with very distinct SNA properties.
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Table 8:The importance of feature attributes based on information gain.
Feature attribute Dataset 1a Dataset 2b Dataset 3c
Average weighted in-degree centrality 1.450 0.997 1.393
Average in-degree centrality 1.441 0.974 1.384
Portion of calls with in-degree of 1 1.371 1.275 1.380
Portion of calls with out-degree of 1 1.360 0.946 1.369
Portion of calls with weighted out-degree of 1 1.107 0.675 1.302
Portion of calls with weighted in-degree of 1 1.068 0.744 1.337
Average distance 1.015 0.430 1.369
Dataset 1a: adware + benign, Dataset 2b: Trojan + benign, and Dataset 3c: worm + benign.
However, when building system call graph, our system lever-
ages the refined system call sequence. Our system extracts the
system calls found in malware and their one-hop neighbors
for behavior identification by comparing invoked system calls
with the predefined malicious system call dictionary. Despite
the fact that malware authors can add useless system calls
for evasion, these system calls which are not included in the
predefined malicious system call dictionary do not have an
influence on the results of our system. At least any two added
system calls will have edges with a system call in themalicious
system call dictionary.This does not significantly change the
structure of our proposed system call graph.Malware authors
might downgrade the results of our system by considering the
system calls which are one-hop neighbors of system calls in
themalicious system call dictionary; we think complexities of
these techniques are high.
Mal-Netminer against Complicated Features.Given that mod-
ern malware embed a mixed number of features (e.g., Trojan
with rootkit and botnet functionalities), our approach has
limitation to classify those malware samples strictly; it is far
more interesting for vendors to classifymalware samples with
mixed features to understand the threats they need to deal
with. However, without understanding the characteristics of
basic malware classes such as adware, Trojan, and worm, we
believe that it is impossible to detect and classify the malware
with more complicated and mixed features. By studying
malware with mixed features and adopting our system, we
enable reacting to those malware.
Dynamic Analysis without Interaction between Human and
PC. Our approach analyzes a target program without inter-
action between human and PC: autonomous installation and
execution. One thinks that most of the interesting behav-
iors are not observed, particularly in the benign programs,
and that could skew the results. It might be reasonable to
assume that, in the absence of evasive malware, the malicious
software would execute its malicious payload as executed,
while benign programs might require user interactions (e.g.,
GUI-based utilities). However, autonomous installation and
execution is an unavoidable procedure for automation of
dynamic analysis. Depending on the number of samples to be
analyzed,we can adoptmanual human interactions to analyze
these samples instead of Behavior Identification Module and
afterward conduct the automatic classification procedure.
Table 9: Distribution of in-degree centrality in adware
(Win32.ScreenSaver 001 case).
System call In-degreecentrality
NtClose 46
NtAlpcSendWaitReceivePort 23
NtAlpcConnectPort 7
NtReleaseMutant 5
NtAllocateVirtualMemory 4
NtDuplicateObject, NtAlertThread,
NtOpenThreadToken, NtQueryValueKey,
NtUnmapViewOfSection, NtOpenKeyEx,
NtCreateTimer, and NtQueryInformationProcess
3
NtQueryKey, NtSetEvent, NtOpenProcessToken,
NtCreateEvent, NtQueryVirtualMemory,
NtTestAlert, NtCreateThreadEx,
NtDeviceIoControlFile, NtOpenProcessTokenEx,
NtAlpcDeleteSecurityContext, NtResumeThread,
NtCreateFile, NtWaitForSingleObject,
NtAlpcSetInformation, NtCreateMutant,
NtWaitForMultipleObjects, and NtOpenKey
2
NtCreateWorkerFactory, NtCreateKeyedEvent,
NtOpenProcess, NtAccessCheckByType,
NtSetValueKey, NtOpenEvent,
NtSetInformationFile, NtCreateKey,
NtOpenSection, NtAccessCheck,
NtSetInformationThread, NtMapViewOfSection,
NtCreateIoCompletion, NtDelayExecution,
NtWaitForKeyedEvent, NtGetMUIRegistryInfo,
NtFreeVirtualMemory,
NtWaitForWorkViaWorkerFactory,
NtQuerySystemInformation, NtEnumerateKey,
NtEnumerateValueKey, NtOpenFile,
NtMapCMFModule,
NtQuerySystemInformationEx,
NtQueryDefaultLocale, NtRequestPort,
NtRequestWaitReplyPort, NtQueryAttributesFile,
NtConnectPort, NtProtectVirtualMemory,
NtWorkerFactoryWorkerReady,
NtNotifyChangeKey, NtCreateSection,
NtQueryInformationFile, NtAlpcCreatePort,
NtSetInformationProcess, NtSetTimer, and
NtTraceControl
1
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Figure 12: An evaluation of the node-level metrics on both Trojan and worm classes using the in-degree and betweenness centralities.
8. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we presented a novel malware classification
method that exploits social network properties as applied to
call graphs from the dynamic execution of malware samples.
Our proposed method is the first attempt to examine the
topological structure of system call graphs and the node prop-
erties of system calls in malware. We explored graph metrics
that measure the influence of system calls found in malware
and those that measure the overall structure of malware.
Through experiments, we found that the graph metrics of
influence are effective for classifying malware, whereas the
general structural information of malware, captured in the
clustering coefficient, network density, and component ratio,
is not effective for classifying malware.
Using this insight, we implemented a system for auto-
matic malware classification. Our system extracts the system
calls found in malware and their one-hop neighbors for
behavior identification by comparing invoked system calls
with the predefinedmalicious system call dictionary: making
the refined system call sequence to depict a system call graph.
It then measures graph properties and uses machine learning
algorithms to train multiple classifiers on a set of mali-
cious executables to classify new malware. Our experiments
demonstrate that the proposed method performs well in
classifying malware families within each class and detecting
malware from benign programs. Our system provides more
than 96%of classification accuracy. Unlike other systems, our
system relies on a small set of features, enabling scalability.
Future Work. One major limitation of our system is that it
classifies malware into broader classes, but not specific ones
given by themarket (e.g., Zeus, ZeroAccess, etc.). To this end,
we plan to explore additional features that can be used for
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Figure 13: Continued.
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Figure 13: An evaluation of the network-level metrics on both Trojan and worm classes using the clustering coefficient, average distance,
average density, and component ratio.
providing insight into lower granularity of malware classes.
Malware clustering, using the features that we discussed in
this paper, is yet another open direction.
Appendices
A. The Distribution of In-Degree
Centrality in Adware
In the following, we outline the distribution of in-degree
centrality in adware. In Table 9, we outline the distribution
of in-degree centrality of Win32.ScreenSaver 001. Notice the
frequency tendency of system calls invoked by the adware
sample.
B. The Detailed Malicious System
Call Dictionary
In the following, we outline the detailed structure of the
malicious system call directory. In Table 10, we outline the
system call dictionary of adware. In Table 11 we outline
the system call dictionary for Trojans. In Table 12 we show
the system call dictionary of worms. Notice the differences
between the different families and types of malicious pieces
of malcode based on their dictionary structure and entries.
C. Data Exploration for Trojan and Worm
Metrics of Node Level. For the node-level metrics studied
in this paper, we choose the in-degree and betweenness
centrality over the features studied in the paper. In particular
and in line with the findings in the paper, the in-degree
centrality for Trojan and worm is shown in Figures 12(a)
Table 10: System call dictionary of adware.
Functionality System call list
Local procedure call
NtAlpcAcceptConnectPort,
NtAlpcConnectPort,
NtAlpcCreatePort, and
NtAlpcSendWaitReceivePort
File & general I/O NtCreateIoCompletion
Object NtClose
Atoms NtFindAtom
Processes & thread
NtResumeThread,
NtCreateUserProcess, and
NtCreateWorkerFactory
Synchronization NtCreateKeyedEvent andNtReleaseMutant
Timers & system time NtSetTimer andNtCreateTimer
and 12(b). Furthermore, the betweenness centrality for both
classes is shown in Figures 12(c) and 12(d).
Metrics of Network Level. Network-level metrics include
the overall clustering coefficient, average distance, network
density, and component ratio. We complement those results
shown in the paper with the following results. In Figures 13(a)
and 13(b), we show the overall clustering coefficient for both
the Trojan and worm classes. In Figures 13(c) and 13(d), we
show the average distance for both Trojan and worm classes,
respectively. In Figures 13(e) and 13(f), we show the network
density for both the Trojan and worm classes, respectively.
Finally, in Figures 13(g) and 13(h), we show the component
ratio for the Trojan and worm classes, respectively. In all of
these figures, findings are in line with the main findings in
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Table 11: System call dictionary of Trojans.
Functionality System call list
Processor & bus NtFlushInstructionCache
Local procedure call
NtConnectPort,
NtRequestWaitReplyPort,
NtAlpcConnectPort, and
NtAlpcSendWaitReceivePort
Memory NtMapViewOfSection
File & general I/O
NtCreateFile,
NtQueryInformationFile, and
NtCreateIoCompletion
Object NtClose
Atoms NtAddAtom
Processes & thread
NtCreateThread, NtResumeThread,
NtCreateProcessEx,
NtQuerySystemInformation,
NtCreateWorkerFactory, and
NtQueryInformationProcess
Synchronization NtCreateKeyedEvent andNtCreateMutant
Timers & system time NtCreateTimer
Table 12: System call dictionary of worms.
Functionality System call list
Processor & bus NtFlushInstructionCache
Local procedure call NtAlpcCreateSecurityContext andNtAlpcSetInformation
Memory NtMapViewOfSection
Registry NtEnumerateKey andNtEnumerateValueKey
Miscellaneous NtQuerySystemInformation
File & general I/O NtCreateFile andNtDeviceIoControlFile
Object NtClose
Atoms NtAddAtom
Processes & thread
NtCreateThread, NtResumeThread,
NtCreateProcessEx, and
NtQueryInformationProcess
Synchronization NtReleaseMutant
Timers & system time NtSetTimer andNtQueryPerformanceCounter
the paper, and all insight on those properties for the example
class applies here as well.
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